Kaum ein anderer lebender Naturwissenschaftler besitzt die Fähigkeit, mit solcher Geistesklarheit die tiefsten Einsichten von moderner Quantenphysik mit dem uralten spirituellen Menschheitswissen zu verknüpfen wie - Hans-Peter Dürr! Es gelingt Dürr scheinbar mühelos, eine Synthese zwischen den meditativen Einsichten der Weisen des Ostens und den aktuellen Erkenntnissen der modernen Naturwissenschaften herzustellen. Dabei verliert er sich niemals in langatmigen akademischen Erläuterungen, sondern hat stets den Menschen und die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit des 21. Jahrhunderts im Blick. Ein Brückenschlag zwischen zwei Welten, (...) der vielleicht niemals notwendiger war als zurzeit. Eine kleines Meisterwerk, das in einleuchtender Weise aufzeigt - alles Leben ist EINS! (shrink)

English summary: Thinking about God is theology's main task and the philosophy of religion's most noble. Like almost no other theologian and philosopher of religion, Ingolf U. Dalferth's devotion to it has made the paradigms of current philosophical and theological theory construction fruitful. God, in whom people believe and place their trust, is revealed as the First and the Last, as the beginning without end, and the end that renews everything. This Festschrift's twenty-four studies pick up from Dalferth's work by (...) thinking about God in their own way. The richness of the questions they pose, the plurality of the answers, and the diversity of the religious-philosophical and theological perspectives affirm the worthiness of thinking God. German description: Gott zu denken, ist die zentrale Aufgabe der Theologie und die vornehmste der Religionsphilosophie. Wie kaum ein anderer Theologe und Religionsphilosoph hat sich Ingolf U. Dalferth dieser Aufgabe gewidmet und dafur die aktuellen Paradigmen philosophischer und theologischer Theoriebildung fruchtbar gemacht. Gott, an den Menschen glauben und auf den sie ihre Hoffnung setzen, kommt dem Denken als Erstes und Letztes in den Blick, als Anfang, der noch kein Ende gefunden hat, und als Ende, das alles neu macht.Die vierundzwanzig Studien dieser Festschrift nehmen Dalferths Beitrage auf, indem sie je auf ihre Weise Gott nachdenken. Der Reichtum der von ihnen diskutierten Fragestellungen, die Pluralitat der Antworten und die Vielfalt der religionsphilosophischen und theologischen Perspektiven bekraftigen die Denkwurdigkeit Gottes. (shrink)

»Wo gesprochen, wird von Etwas gesprochen, das in allen andren Fällen vor diesem Sprechen davon bekannt ist, und da ist: -- hier, von etwas, das nur durch das Sprechen davon, und in diesem Sprechen, ist und wird, u. [anders] durchaus nicht ist. Es folgt daraus, daß jeder, mit dem gesprochen werden soll, dies unmittelbar selber erzeugen muß; weder erinnert an etwas bekanntes; noch etwa auffassen, auf den Vorrath, sondern hier auf der Stelle es denken, begreifen, u. abmachen. -- Ausserdem ist (...) von Nichts geredet. ist leer die Klage über Leerheit dieser Spekulationen; ist gegründeter als die Klagenden meinen; nur auch aus einem anderen Grunde, als sie meinen.«. (shrink)

»Wo gesprochen, wird von Etwas gesprochen, das in allen andren Fällen vor diesem Sprechen davon bekannt ist, und da ist: -- hier, von etwas, das nur durch das Sprechen davon, und in diesem Sprechen, ist und wird, u. [anders] durchaus nicht ist. Es folgt daraus, daß jeder, mit dem gesprochen werden soll, dies unmittelbar selber erzeugen muß; weder erinnert an etwas bekanntes; noch etwa auffassen, auf den Vorrath, sondern hier auf der Stelle es denken, begreifen, u. abmachen. -- Ausserdem ist (...) von Nichts geredet. ist leer die Klage über Leerheit dieser Spekulationen; ist gegründeter als die Klagenden meinen; nur auch aus einem anderen Grunde, als sie meinen.«. (shrink)

In diesem Buch wird eine Strategie gegen zwei skeptische Tendenzen entwickelt, deren eine den Sonderstatus von Personen bestreitet und deren andere" wahr"für ein Prädikat ausgibt, das schlicht gewissen Verwendungsregeln unterworfen und instrumentalistisch zu interpretieren sei. Die antiskeptische Strategie soll dadurch zum Erfolg führen, dass die beiden von der Skepsis bedrohten Sachverhalte sich gegenseitig stützen. Gezeigt wird, dass die Aufgabe des Sonderstatus von Personen die Leugnung der Bedeutung von" wahr"impliziert und umgekehrt. Positiv gewendet: Die Bedeutung von" wahr"ist in Beziehung auf Subjektivität (...) zu explizieren, und Subjektivität erschließt sich theoretisch durch die Beziehung auf Wahrheit. Die Vorgehensweise ist im wesentlichen negativ; ihr positiver Aspekt besteht in der systematischen Zuordnung der negativen Ergebnisse. Zu Gegenständen der Kritik werden dabei der Naturalismus in der reduktiven wie der eliminationistischen Variante sowie ontologisierende Ansätze, d. h. Versuche, philosophische Probleme durch das Postulat von Entitäten sui generis zu lösen. In der Ablehnung von Ontologisierungen und im negativen Charakter der philosophischen Tätigkeit ergeben sich Berührungspunkte mit dem späten Wittgenstein. Die Differenz liegt in der erwähnten Zuordnung der Resultate der Kritik, die es erlaubt, die intendierte Position als eine transzendentalphilosophische zu charakterisieren. (shrink)

Summary In the field of scientific knowledge ‘truth’ can be defined exactly by mathematical methods (topology), provided there is a certain interaction between theories and experiments.

In the following the details of a state-of-affairs semantics for positive free logic are worked out, based on the models of common inner domain - outer domain semantics. Lambert's PFL system is proven to be weakly adequate (i.e., sound and complete) with respect to that semantics by demonstrating that the concept of logical truth definable therein coincides with that one of common truth-value semantics for PFL. Furthermore, this state-of-affairs semantics resists the challenges stemming from the slingshot argument since logically equivalent (...) statements do not always have the same extension according to it. Finally, it is argued that in such a semantics all statements of a certain language for PFL are state-of-affairs-related extensional as well as salva extensione extensional, even though their salva veritate extensionality fails. (shrink)

If one takes seriously the idea that a scientific language must be extensional, and accepts Quine’s notion of truth-value-related extensionality, and also recognizes that a scientific language must allow for singular terms that do not refer to existing objects, then there is a problem, since this combination of assumptions must be inconsistent. I will argue for a particular solution to the problem, namely, changing what is meant by the word ‘extensionality’, so that it would not be the truth-value that had (...) to be preserved under the substitution of co-extensional expressions, but the state of affairs that the sentence described. The question is whether or not elementary sentences containing empty singular terms, such as ‘Vulcan rotates’, are extensional in the substitutivity sense. Five conditions are specified under which extensionality in the substitutivity sense of such sentences can be secured. It is demonstrated that such sentences are state-of-affairs-as-extension-related extensional. This implies that such sentences are also truth-value-related extensional in Quine’s sense, but not truth-value-as-extension-related extensional. (shrink)

The search for the extensions of sentences can be guided by Frege’s “principle of compositionality of extension”, according to which the extension of a composed expression depends only on its logical form and the extensions of its parts capable of having extensions. By means of this principle, a strict criterion for the admissibility of objects as extensions of sentences can be derived: every object is admissible as the extension of a sentence that is preserved under the substitution of co-extensional expressions. (...) The question is: what are the extensions of elementary sentences containing empty singular terms, like ‘Vulcan rotates’. It can be demonstrated that in such sentences, states of affairs as structured objects (but not truth-values) are preserved under the substitution of co-extensional expressions. Hence, such states of affairs are admissible (while truth-values are not) as extensions of elementary sentences containing empty singular terms. (shrink)

In German discussions over the last twenty years of the difference between what it is to be a body (in German: Leibsein) and what it is to have a body (Körperhaben), many have been concerned to remind us that we owe this conceptual distinction to the philosophical anthropologist Helmuth Plessner. He introduces the distinction in an essay from 1925—written in collaboration with the Dutch behavioral researcher Frederick Jacob Buytendijk—“Die Deutung des mimischen Ausdrucks. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Bewusstsein des anderen (...) Ichs” (“The Interpretation of Mimetic Expressions: A Contribution to Understanding One’s Consciousness of Other Subjects”). Buytendijk later explained that it was Plessner who worked out the .. (shrink)

In Popper's Logik der Forschung, a theoretical system is a set of sentences that describe a particular sub-area of science, in particular of empirical science. The goal of axiomatizing a theoretical system is to specify a small number of "axioms" describing all presuppositions of the sub-area under consideration, so that all other sentences of this system can be derived from them by means of logical or mathematical transformations. The paper discusses two philosophical interpretations of these proper axioms. First, proper axioms (...) stipulate the use of the signs for the basic concepts of the system. Consequently, the proper axioms turn out to be analytic relative to a class of interpretations of the underlying logic. Hence, they cannot be falsified by refuting their logical consequences because these consequences are analytic as well. Secondly, proper axioms are synthetic, falsifiable and uncertain sentences. Hence, they are not immunized against falsification by refuting their logical consequences. (shrink)

Why has the global West (North America, Europe) handled the covid-19 pandemic and the corresponding economic crisis so much worse than the global East (East Asia)? The crises demonstrate the degree to which the West is shaped by its forms of competition and the East by its forms of cooperation. In the West, we have become habitualised to American neoliberalism over the last two generations. In the East, varieties of neo-Confucianism and neo-Buddhism have been transformed into national cultures. The way (...) humans understand their position in the world intellectually and react to crises according to corresponding habit makes an effective difference. The present comparison between global East and West makes use of Hannah Arendt’s conception ofpoliticsand theshared worldas well as of Helmuth Plessner’s conception ofmediated immediacyin forms ofmodern biopower. The pandemic is a catalyst within the decline of the West and the rise of the East. (shrink)

Gödel’s slingshot-argument proceeds from a referential theory of definite descriptions and from the principle of compositionality for reference. It outlines a metasemantic proof of Frege’s thesis that all true sentences refer to the same object—as well as all false ones. Whereas Frege drew from this the conclusion that sentences refer to truth-values, Gödel rejected a referential theory of definite descriptions. By formalising Gödel’s argument, it is possible to reconstruct all premises that are needed for the derivation of Frege’s thesis. For (...) this purpose, a reference-theoretical semantics for a language of first-order predicate logic with identity and referentially treated definite descriptions will be defined. Some of the premises of Gödel’s argument will be proven by such a reference-theoretical semantics, whereas others can only be postulated. For example, the principle that logically equivalent sentences refer to the same object cannot be proven but must be assumed in order to derive Frege’s thesis. However, different true (or false) sentences can refer to different states of affairs if the latter principle is rejected and the other two premises are maintained. This is shown using an identity criterion for states of affairs according to which two states of affairs are identical if and only if they involve the same objects and have the same necessary and sufficient condition for obtaining. (shrink)

Though Helmuth Plessner (1892-1985) elaborated his philosophical anthropology independently of the classical pragmatisms, there are many parallels with them. He combined a phenomenology of living beings (a parallel with William James) with a semiotic reconstruction (a parallel with Charles Sanders Peirce) of what we are already using whenever we specify living beings, among them ourselves as human living beings in nature, culture, and society. In Plessner’s distinction between having a body (Körperhaben) and being (or living) a body (Leibsein), there is (...) a parallel with George Herbert Mead’s “Me” (taking over the perspective of others) and “I” (spontaneous actions/reactions of an organism in a situation). Dewey and Plessner elaborated a public procedure for overcoming the old dualism of matter and idea in a process of learning better habits. Their historical conceptions of communication involve the primacy of interactions on three levels (discursive, conscious, pre-conscious living). Facing the plasticity of human conduct, both approaches open the door to a pluralistic self-understanding that includes value-conflicts and that therefore needs civilized forms to solve such conflicts. With regard to the limits of human conduct, Plessner proposed a phenomenology (of laughing and crying) that seems to have no equivalent in pragmatism. (shrink)